Fordham Law Review
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 3

1916

Recent Decisions

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Recent Decisions, 3 Fordham L. Rev. 21 (1916).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol3/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

FORDHAM
By

EDITED

LAW REVIEW

FORDHAm

LAW STUDENTS

EDITORIAL BOARD
Cornelius J. Smyth, Faculty Editor
Henry W. Boyce, Editor-in-Chief
Louis W. Fehr, Mfanaging Editor
Maurice L. Ahern
William M. Bennett
Thomas J. Geraty
Jacob I. Goodstein
Edwin S. Murphy

Sylvester Ryan
Julius A. Cohen
Edward J. Garity
David J. Goldberg
Maurice R. Roche
James George Lynch

Michael F. L. Walsh
Walter Aberg
Bernard Kronthal
Philip J. O'Connor
John L. Dunn

Address The Fordham Law Review, 233 Broadway, New York City.

RECENT DECISIONS.
EVIDENCE-CRIMINAL LAW-CoMFETENCY OF EVIDENCE OF
ANOTHER CRIME.-The indictment charged the defendant with
having assaulted the complainant by striking him with a bottle.
The defence was an alibi. The People were permitted to introduce
testimony over the objection and exception of defendant, tending
to prove that he had visited the complainant's place of business
about two weeks prior to the time of the assault, with a large
number of other persons, accompanied by a "walking delegate,"
the latter warning complainant against working for a non-union
shop, and on this occasion defendant destroyed about $50 worth
of garments belonging to complainant. Held, that the defence of
an alibi raised in the most direct manner an issue as to the
identity of the person who assaulted complainant, and that the
previous occurrence had a tendency to show the existence of a
motive, and hence that the cvidence was admissible as tending
to establish a motive, a common scheme or plan, and the identity
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of the person charged with the crime specified in the indictment.
(The People v. Thau, 219 N. Y., 39.)
The trial court had rendered judgment upon a verdict convicting defendant of assault. Upon appeal judgment was reversed
on the ground that it was error to admit evidence of the earlier
occurrence, the Court being of the opinion that "there was no
question of identity in the case; that the evidence was not admissible as bearing upon the motive with which the assault was committed, and that the two occurrences were so dissimilar that the
proof had no tendency to establish a common intent." (168 App.
Div., 842.)
The well settled rule that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible unless such evidence is relevant to the issue or issues on trial,
(People v. Shea, 147 N. Y., 78), is not invaded by this case. Any
fact which tends to establish either (1) motive, (2) intent, (3)
the absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan,
embracing two or more schemes so related to each other that proof
of one tends to establish the others, or (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial, is relevant
to the issues on trial. (People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y., 264.)
So far as the difference of opinion between the New York
courts as to defendant's guilt in the case under discussion is
concerned, they unquestionably are as one regarding the law covering the admissibility of the disputed evidence, and appear to be
at variance merely in their interpretation of the facts. It would
seem that the evidence of the earlier occurrence DOES tend to
establish the essentials necessary to make it competent to prove
the crime charged, and was therefore properly received. The
Court, however, refused to extend the policy administered in the
Molineux case (supra,) and in this respect we likewise accord with
it. It is submitted that the principal case is sound on both principle and authority.

WILLs-PowER OF APPOINTMENT-]FFECT OF RESIDUARY
CLAUSE-PRESUMPTION OF INTENT UNDER THE NFW YORK REAL
PROPERTY LAW AND PERSONAL PROPERTY LAw.-A testator gave

his property in trust to apply the net income thereof to his .on for
life. It further provided that the latter might, by will, dispose of
one-third of the fund "to or among my then living lineal descendants and his wife him surviving or any or either of them and in such
manner and proportion as to him shall seem proper." C, the son,
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married and thereafter died, leaving no issue. He bequeathed
the property over which he had the power of appointment to his
wife as long as she remained a widow, with power to appoint by
will the principal to certain named organizations. The residue
and remainder of his estate he gave to his wife. After her death
a dispute arose as to whether the provisions of C's will was a
valid exercise of the power contained in his father's will. Held,
that this clause was only valid to the extent that it appointed an
estate to his wife during widowhood; that the remaining provisions,
giving her the power of appointing the principal to certain organizations, were void, and that such principal passed by the residuary
clause to his wife. (McLean v. McLean, 160 N. Y. Suppl., 949.)
Under section 176 of the Real Property Law, "real property
embraced in a power to devise passes by a will purporting to convey all the real property of the testator, unless the intent that the
will is not to operate as an execution of the powers appears, either
expressly or by necessary implication ;" and by section 18 of the
Personal Property Law the same rule is applied to personal property. An attempted appointment is to be construed precisely as if
it had been a devise or bequest of the donee's own property.
(Austin v. Oakes, 117 N. Y., 577.) Ordinarily, a residuary clause
carries with it all property of the testator not otherwise disposed
of, unless the language of the will itself prohibits such a construction. (In re Bonnett, 113 N. Y., 522; Albany Hospital v. Albany
GuardianSociety, 214 N. Y., 435, 446.) The intent not to execute
a power of appointment cannot be implied unless it so clearly
appears that it cannot be avoided. (Lockwood v. Mildeberger,
159 N. Y., 181.) What C would have meant or intended to do
with the remainder, had he supposed that the attempted power
to his wife was invalid, must be supplied by legal presumption
following the ordinary rule of construction when applied to a will
of the testator's own property. (Riker v. Cornwall, 113 N. Y.,
115; Langley v. Westchester Trust Company, 180 N. Y., 326.)
This is a case of novel impression, in New York State at least.
There does not seem to be any decision where it has been held
that a general residuary clause will carry with it property covered
by an attempted execution of a power of appointment held to be
void. However, the statutes quoted are clear on the point. In
the construction of a similar English statute, it has been held that
a general residuary clause operates to pass property embraced
within a void execution of a power of appointment. (Freme v.
Clement, L. R., 18 Ch. Div., 499; In re Hunt, L. R., 31 Ch. Div.,
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308.) In the absence of judicial precedent, the application of the
statutes to the facts and the resulting decision seem to be justified
and sound.

EVIDENcE-DECLARATION BEARING UPON INTERNAL PHYSICAL
CONDITION-ADMISSIBILIT.-Where, in an action upon an insur-

ance policy, plaintiff offers to prove that the insured had complained to the witness of pain in specific portions of his body.
Held, the evidence was admissible as establishing the then
internal physical condition of the insured (Tromblee vs. North
American Acc. Ins. Co., 158 N. Y. Supp. 1014).
Evidence that plaintiff emitted groans, grunts or sighs, where
established by the testimony of a third party, is not hearsay, and
is admissible as an evidential fact. (Caldzell vs. Murphy, 11 N.
Y. 416; Hagenlocherv. C. I. & B. R. R. Co., 99 N. Y. 137.) Prior
to the time when parties were competent as witnesses in their own
behalf, statements made by plaintiff to third parties bearing on his
or her then internal physical condition were held admissible as a
matter of necessity. (Werely v. Persons, 28 N. Y. 344.)
By a misinterpretation of the language of Bigelow, C. J., in
Barker v. Merriam, (11 All. 322), defining the Massachusetts
rule that statements of PAST internal physical condition are admissible when made to a physician for the purpose of obtaining professional treatment, the holding of the New York courts, as laid
down in Werely v. Persons (supra) was limited to the extent,
that statements bearing on PRESENT internal physical condition
were made inadmissible unless made to a physician for the purpose of obtaining treatment. (Allen v. Reed, 45 N. Y. 578;
Rocher B. C. & N. R. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 294.) These decisions
rest on the principle (1) that if the plaintiff is living, he is competent to testify as to his own pain and suffering, and hence there is
no need of allowing an exception to the Hearsay Rule in favor of
testimony of third parties as to statements made by plaintiff bearing upon his then internal physical condition; (2) that if plaintiff is dead, evidence as to his pain and suffering is irrelevant in
an action based on his death as a new and distinct cause of action.
Whether this reasoning be sound or not, (Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 3 # 1719,) the rule in this State, as to the admissibility, through testimony of a third party, of statements bearing
on the present internal physical condition of declarant, is clear.
It would seem, therefore, that the ruling in the principal case is a
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positive departure from the limitation of precedent, and a reversion
to the early New York doctrine. (Caldwell v. Murphy, supra.)
It is submitted that on the facts of the principal case, the evidence was properly admitted.

CONDITIONAL SALE-FORECLOSURE OF LIEN-EFFECT THEREOF.

-In an action to foreclose a lien under Sec. 139 of the Municipal
Court Act on an agreement in form of lease which provided for
payment in installments of the agreed value of certain articles, as
rental, and the right to purchase them for one dollar on completion
of rental payments, Held, on appeal, that the instrhment though
called a lease was in fact a conditional sale and that plaintiff's
election to foreclose invested defendant with title to the goods
together with the right to such defences to the action as the facts
warranted. (Bramhall-Deane Co. v. McDonald, 172 App. Div.
780)
A contract of conditional sale may take such form as the parties
choose to give it, "but the legal aspect must depend not upon the
name which the parties have applied to the contract, nor upon the
form of the instrument, but upon the intention as evidenced by the
entire contract." (35 Cyc. 654, and cases cited.) Where, therefore, the written contract is substantially a contract of conditional
sale, the courts so regard it, notwithstanding the instrument may
term itself a "contract of hiring" (Jacob v. Haefelien, 66 N. Y.
Supp. 1007; similarly held in New Jersey, see Lauter Co. v. Isenreath, 72 Atl. Rep. 56) or a "lease" (Gardnerv. Town of Cameron,
155 App. Div. 750, affd. 215 N. Y. 682) or that the installments
of the purchase price to be paid are denominated as "rent" (Equitable Gen'l. Providing Co. v. Eisentrager, 34 Misc. 179; Campbell
Printing Press, etc., Co. v. Oltrogge, 13 Daly 247; Hoffman v.
White Sewing Mach. Co., 108 N. Y. Supp. 253; Ostrander v.
Bricka, 154 N. Y. Supp. 786). On the construction of the contract
in the principal case as one of conditional sale, the holding is in
sound accord with the New York decisions to the effect that where
the stipulated rental payments of an agreement aggregate the value
of the leased property and are to be substituted for it a sale is at
law shown to have been intended.
Section 139 of the Municipal Court Act (laws of 1910, c. 542,
in force until August 31, 1915; corresponding Secs. 70 and 73.
Municipal Court Code, Laws of 1915, c. 279) prohibited in the
Municipal Court any action arising on a contract of conditional
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sale of personal property except an action to foreclose a lien.
Hence a conditional vendor not availing himself of his remedy
under Art. 4, Personal Property Law (Consol. Laws, c. 41) to
re-take the property, nor bringing an action of conversion in the
proper court, can bring an action to foreclose a. lien, but an election
so to do is binding upon him and conversion will not thereafter
lie (Kirk v. Crystal, 118 App. Div. 32, affd. 193 N. Y. 622), nor
can he asserting his own title have a lien upon his own goods
(Nelson v. Gibson, 143 App. Div. 894) for it is the well settled law
of New York that a conditional vendor cannot have both the property and the purchase price (see White v. A. W. Gray's Sons, 96
App. Div. 154, and cases there cited), and where foreclosure of a
lien is elected, defendant (the conditional vendee), is vested both
with title and the right to such defenses to the action as the facts
warrant (viz., the vendor's breach of warranty, is in the principal
case).

CORPORATIONS-OBLIGATION TO PAY FOR UNISSUED STOcK DE-

OF THIRD PARTY.-Defendant, by a written
contract with one M, agreed that he would subscribe for stock in
plaintiff corporation. Pursuant thereto, a certificate of stock
was delivered to him. The corporation later sued on the agreement. Held, the contract being between M and defendant, the
corporation could not take advantage of the contract, there being
no obligation between M and the corporation. (Sanders v. Proctor, 172 App. Div. 713.)
Accepting and holding a certificate of stock is sufficient to constitute one a stockholder, and he becomes liable for the price of
the shares. (Cook on Corporations,vol 1, sec. 52, p. 252; 10 Cyc.
381; Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45; Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S.
665.) It is equivalent to a subscription or agreement to take the
stock. (Barron v. Burrill, 86 Me. 72; Clevenger v. Moore, 71
N. J. L. 148; H. & N. H. R. R. v. Kennedy, 2 Conn. Rep. 509.)
"T'he early New York cases also followed this doctrine, although
the question as to the liability of defendant to pay for stock delivered at the request of a third party, does not seem to have ever
been adjudicated. (Rensselaer v. Westel, 21 Barb. 56; Seymour v.
Sturgess, 26 N. Y. 134.) A decided change was brought about
by section 53 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, however:
"At the time of. subscribing every subscriber whose subscription
is payable in money shall pay to the directors ten per centum upon
LIVERED AT REQUEST
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the amount subscribed by him in cash, and no such subscription
shall be received or taken without such payment."
Whatever the law may have been in New York prior to the
statute, it is now well settled that no subscription for stock is
valid unless the ten per cent. is paid to the directors in cash. The
Court in the principal case based its decision upon, the absence of
obligation between M and the corporation which was necessary
to bring the case within Lawrence v. Fox (20 N. Y. 268). Nonperformance of the above-stated requirement would seem to have
been sufficient ground for the dismissal of the complaint, obviating the need of adverting to the sole beneficiary doctrine to sustain
the decision, which was manifestly sound in the conclusion reached.

REAL

PROPERTY-TITLE

TO

STREETS-VAULT

SPACES UNDER

STREETS.-Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants perpetually from
interfering with vault spaces beneath their premises on Cortlandt
Street in New York City, basing their claim on alleged ownership
of the soil, in fee, under a Dutch grant in 1644, before the street
existed as such. The City Council laid out the street in 1733,
and a statute permitted the widening of it by five feet on each
side in 1784. Plaintiffs or their predecessors in title built the
vaults in 1859, without the municipal permission or the payment
which were then required by ordinance. Defendants discovered
the vaults in 1912 and demanded that plaintiffs obtain a permit
and make the required payments, claiming that the City obtained
the fee to the five feet of additional width under the authorizing
statute of 1784. Held, -that the right of the City to compel
the obtaining of such a permit and the payment of the sums
demanded exists, irrespective of the ownership of the fee, as an
element in the authorized regulation and supervision of the streets.
(Appleton v. City of New York, 219 N. Y. 150.)
The right of sovereignty of the Dutch government under the
Roman-Dutch civil law, by which the title to a public street was
in the sovereign, (Dunham v. Williams, 37 N. Y. 251,) did not
pass to the British Crown upon the surrender of the town to that
power, but all fee titles remained securely vested in their private
owners. (Capitulation Articles of 1664.) Thereafter, when the
City Council dedicated the property in question to use as a public
street, the fee remained in the owners. (Barclay v. Howell's
Lessee, 6 Peters, 498.)
When the street was subsequently
widened, nothing was said in the authorizing statute, (Laws of
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1784,) prescribing the taking of the fee to the land appropriated.
Where the language and intent of a statute do not otherwise
require, the fee remains in the owner. (Mott v. Eno, 181 N. Y.
346.) But, owners of the bed of a street have' no right to construct vaults therein without permission of the municipal authorities. The City has the duty of supervision and inspection of
the streets. (Ryan v. Franklin, 199 N. Y. 347.) The right of
the public authorities to exact a payrrient or fee for a permission
or privilege of exercising a private possession or advantage in a
public street * * * is undoubted. (Deshong v. City of New
York, 176 N. Y. 475; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124.)
There can be no doubt, in view 6f the cited authorities, that
the defendant's contention as to the ownership of the fee, is
erroneous. However, having in mind the modern tendency of
the courts to strengthen the hands of municipalities in their
efforts to regulate or supervise private ownerships which come in
contact or conflict with public purposes, it is submitted that the
holding in the principal case is entirely in accord therewith, and
is a decision dictated by the doctrine of public policy.

NAVIGABLE WATERS-RIGHT
SUBJECT

TO PUBLIc

OF STATE TO GRANT

EASEMENT.-Plaintiffs

FEE

NOT

seek injunction for

the removal of permanent structures between high and low water
marks at Coney Island. Defendant Huber, an upland owner,
shows an unqualified grant to three hundred feet of shore from
the State. Held, a grant of public lands under navigable waters
containing no restrictions is not subject to any easement in favor
of the public. (People v. Steeplechase Park,et al., 218 N. Y. 459.)
At common law the jus privatum, or right of private property
to the soil under navigable waters, was presumptively in the
Crown. But the jus privatum was subject to the jus publicum, or
trusteeship of the Crown for the public. (Bardes v. Herman, 144
N. Y. Supp. 1098; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N. J. Law 1; Fowler's
Real Property Law of the State of New York, p. 100.) The
Crown could not alienate the jus publicum. (Attorney General v.
Richards, 2 Anst. 603; People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y. 287, 293;,
Farnham, Water and Water Rights, Vol. 1, pp. 100-102.)
It does not appear that the higher courts of this State have
ever before passed on the exact question involved in the principal
case, but there are many cases containing conflicting dicta. Those
relied upon by the Court involve grants to promote navigation,
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commerce and public purposes, the right to make which is not
disputed. (People v. N. Y. & S. I. F. Co., 68 N. Y. 71; Langdon v.
Mayor &c., 93 id. 129; Sauiiders v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.,
144 id. 74; Coxe v. State of New York, 144 id. 396; Matter of
Long Sault Development Co., 212 id. 1; People v. D. & H. Co.,
213 id. 194.)
On the other hand in the same and other New York cases the
doctrine of the right of the public against the individual and
-against adverse legislation as to navigable waters, and lands under
such waters, has been repeatedly upheld. (People v. N. Y. & S.
I. F. Co., supra; Bedlow v. N. Y. Floating Dry Dock Co., 112
N. Y. 263, 274; Coxe v. State of N. Y., supra; Matter of Long
Sault Development Co., supra.) In other States, on facts almost
similar to those in the principal case, courts have reached an
opposite conclusion, and have decided that the title to the soil
underneath the water can be in a private owner, (Treat v. Lord,
42 Me. 552; Little Rock, M. R. & T. R. Co. v. Brooks, 39 Ark.
403; Packer v. Ryder, 144 Mass. 440; Forestier v. Johnson, 127
Pac. Rtp..156; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Illinois, 144 U. S. 387.) With
this doctrine the text writers seem to be in accord. (FarnhamWater and Water Rights, p. 229; Fowler's Real Property Law,
p. 100; Angell, Tide Waters, p. 64; Gould, Law of Waters, p. 75,
Ed. of 1883.)
In the principal case, three judges held that the State controls
the jus publicum as well as the jus privatum. One judge recognized
the right of the public to unobstructed navigation, but said that
there was "no substantial interference with navigation". Three
judges, dissenting, held that there should be "an implied reservation of public rights", which seems to be supported by the weight
of authority. A rule based on "substantial interference" could
probably be supported by some of the previous decisions and the
text writers, but the principle laid down by the judges in the prevailing opinion appears to be an innovation in the New York law
-of lands under navigable waters.

NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAusE.-Defendant in violation of
law stored an open chest of nitroglycerin caps on public land.
The caps were packed in tin boxes labeled "Blasting caps, handle
with care." The tin boxes were packed in unmarked wooden
boxes. Two boys, of the ages of twelve and thirteen, carried off
one of the wooden boxes, emptied the contents of most of the tin
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boxes into it, and hid their spoils about one-half mile distant.
The next day they carried off the box, and the decedent, a boy
aged eight, ran after them. There was an explosion and the three
boys were killed. In an action to recover for the death of the
plaintiff's intestate, held, that his death was not the proximate
result of the open chest in the highway, but that the purpose of the
boys in stealing the caps, the period of time which intervened
between the theft and the explosion and the change of place. constituted a series of new and unexpected causes which had to
intervene before said explosives could bring death to the intestate.
Defendant being liable for only the proximate consequences of
his wrong, the complaint was dismissed. (Perry v. Rochester
Lime Co., 219 N. Y. 60.)
Although the defendant's violation of a statute or ordinance
and the plaintiff's injuries consequent thereupon be shown, the
former will not be liable merely because his act constituted a
violation of a state or municipal law, but only if such act proximately caused the injuries complained of. (21 Cyc. 480 and cases
cited.) The wrong-doer must answer for only those consequences
of his wrongful act, which, as a reasonably prudent man he ought
to have foreseen. (Hall v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 214 N. Y. 49; Atchison
& T. & S. F. Ry. v. Calhoun, 213 U. S. 1, 7; McDowell v. Great
Western Ry. 1903, 2 K. B. 331, 337.)
The defendant owed to the children who frequented and played
on the public place whereon the explosive was stored, a duty to
guard them against perils, reasonably forseeable (Travell v.
Baunerman, 174 N. Y. 47; Walsh v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 145
id. 301.) It was contended, however, that such duty was not now
called into play, since the acts of the two boys in stealing the wooden
box, removing the caps, carrying them away, hiding them, and then
killing the plaintiff's intestate the following day, were not a proximate result of the open chest being left in the highway, and were not
within the range of reasonable expectation. "The remoteness of
the relation" says Cardozo, J., speaking for the Court, "controls
our judgment and distinguishes the case at hand from others where
liability has been enforced". This holding is in entire accord with
a very recent Massachusetts decision, (Moran v. Inhabitants of
Watertown, 217 Mass. 185,) wherein, under similar facts, the
Court held that the dynamite was not the proximate cause of the
injury. (See also Jacobs v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 212 Mass.
97; Afflick v. Bates, 21 R. I. 281.) It is submitted that the trend
displayed by the principal case and the case in 217 Mass. supra,

